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TitleCase Studies in Project Management - Miller Park Stadium
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Table of Contents
                            Front Matter
Table of Contents
Case Study: Miller Park Stadium Project
	Introduction
	The Inception Phase
		Assessment and Analysis
	The Development Phase
		Assessment and Analysis
	The Implementation Phase
		Assessment and Analysis
	The Closeout Phase
		Assessment and Analysis
	Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis
	References
Miller Park Stadium Project: Teaching Note
	Project Life Cycle Phases, Project Management Process Groups, and Knowledge Areas
		Project Life-Cycle Phases
			Inception
			Development
			Execution
			Closeout
		Project Management Process Groups
		Project Management Knowledge Areas
                        
Document Text Contents
Page 1

Project Management Institute

Case Studies in Project Management

Miller Park Stadium Project

By:
Scott Serich, PhD, PMP, Graham Bale, MSPM, PMP, Mary Kay Kwasny, MSPM, PMP,

Steven Patneaude, MSPM, ASCPM, Jeff Stack, MSPM, PMP

Edited by:
Frank T. Anbari, PhD, PMP

The George Washington University

Page 2

Miller Park Stadium Project

Case Study

Miller Park Stadium Project
Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................. 3
The Inception Phase ............................................................................................................................................... 4
The Development Phase ........................................................................................................................................ 8
The Implementation Phase .................................................................................................................................. 11
The Closeout Phase ............................................................................................................................................... 15
Summary of Project Assessment and Analysis .................................................................................................. 18
References .............................................................................................................................................................. 19
Teaching Note ....................................................................................................................................................... 21

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Miller Park Stadium Project

overruns? No documentation existed within the contracts governing the project other than what had been
drafted in the MOU.

Although the provisions of Act 56 were based on the MOU, the District believes that it is an
inappropriate benchmark because it is a generally worded, out-of-date document. Neverthe-
less, because the District’s current stadium project budget includes amounts similar to those
included in the MOU—US$249.5 million for stadium construction, and US$71.9 million for
infrastructure improvements—the District asserts the project is within its established budget.

What the District failed to account for were lease costs associated with the project that escalated
the cost an additional US$76 million. One significant item that was leased was Miller Park’s scoreboard.
Establishing the proper risk mitigation tools into the project’s contractual infrastructure during the develop-
ment phase of the project would have definitely benefited the circumstances that came into fruition
when the audit was conducted on the Miller Park project during the implementation phase. The lack of
coordination between communicating the cost overruns associated with the project directly reflect on the
contract manager’s ability to communicate the variances from the MOU and what was actually being
expended. The project manager overseeing the project should have been communicating this information
as well, via schedule and cost control analysis. Working together, the contract manager and project manager
could have been able to make the necessary recommendations to limit cost overruns and improve the
contracts to support required changes. Instead, the project’s cost grew and was paid for by the public.

The risk picture changed, however, during implementation. Most notable of those that led to the
change were the events that preceded the collapse of a 567-foot crane on 14 July 1999. Ten weeks before
the incident, the site safety coordinator for the project quit both the project and his position as field safety
director with his construction company, citing that he was given inadequate authority to carry out his
safety responsibilities. In addition, iron workers were threatening to stay home—a clear violation of the
union’s ‘‘no walk-out or strike’’ agreement for this project—until an official who helped supervise the roof
lifts was removed. Other workers were quitting the project and one subcontractor was fired only days prior
to the accident for being unwilling to make the lift during high winds. It was also noted after the accident
that the crane had been extended from 467 ft (142 m) to 567 ft (173 m) two weeks prior to the accident
without any additional ballast added to offset the additional boom.

On the day of the accident, the subcontractor doing the lifting did not ensure the crane operators
were present for pre-lift meetings, something of no surprise given the lack of enforced mandatory ‘‘toolbox
talk’’ meeting attendance. It was also revealed there were no lift calculations made for the ill-fated lift to
assess the effect of the 26-mph winds blowing just prior to the lift.

To the credit of the project managers, there were few accidents prior to the crane incident, the
most significant of which involved a worker who survived a 60-foot fall on May 10, 1999. Also, the operator
of the crane that collapsed had 47 years of experience with cranes, and 15 years of experience with the
crane that toppled. Unfortunately, however, the crane operator carrying the three men who were killed
was far less experienced.

The project managers reacted effectively by agreeing to bring in outside consulting services to
assess the status of the project and monitor the work being performed. They also re-phased the construction
of the project to keep workers idled by the accident from moving on to other jobs. Also agreed to were
the insurance companies’ demands for more authority to be given to the project’s safety officers as well
as insurance company oversight of all future project safety issues.

As early as 1997, the Miller Park Joint Venture knew that the Miller Park project was severely over
budget. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported on 13 November 1997, that ‘‘Miller Park, the Milwaukee
Brewer’s new stadium, will cost nearly US$398 million, almost US$76 million more than originally agreed
upon, a new state audit released Wednesday concludes’’ (Walker, 1997). To ensure the project’s costs were
being properly reported to the public, a state representative had called the audit.

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