Document Text Contents
Page 2
G. W. F. Hegel
Faith & Knowledge
Translated by Walter Cerf
and H. S. Harris
State University of New York Press
Albany 1977
Page 118
So
Fnith and Knowledge
It is, namely, in the reflecting iudgment4 :1 that Kant finds the mid-
dle term between the concept of nature and the concept of freedom.
On one side, there is the objective manifold determined by concepts,
the intellect generally44 ; and, on the other side, the intellect as pure
abstractionY Neither theoretical nor practical philosophy had lifted
themselves above the sphere of the absolute judgment ;46 the middle
ground is the region of the identity of what in the absolute judgment
is subject and predicate ;47 this identity is the one and only true Rea-
son. Yet according to Kant it belongs only i:u the reflecting judgment;
it is nothing for Reason. Throughout Kant's reflections on Reason in
its reality, that is, in his reflection on beauty as conscious intuition4~
and on beauty as non-conscious intuition, that is, on organization
[in nature] 4n one finds the Idea of Reason expressed in a more or less
formal fashion. With respect to beauty in its conscious form (die
ideelle For111 der Sclzonl1eit) Kant sets up the Idea of an imagination
lawful by itself, of lawfulness without law and of free concord of
imagination and intellect00 His explanations of this sound very em-
pirical, however. When he tells us, for example, that "an esthetic
Idea is a representation by the imagination which gives rise to much
thought without any particular concept being adequate to it, so that
it cannot be reached by, and made understandable in any language,"51
there is no sign that he has even the mildest suspicion that we are
here in the territory of Reason.
In resolving the antinomy of taste Kant comes upon Reason as
"the key to the riddle"; but it is still nothing but "the undetermined
Idea of the supersensuous in us [ ... ] without any further possibility
of its being made comprehensible""2-as if Kant himself had not given
43 Compare p. 77 n 22 above.
44. Compare Prolegomena, section 21 (Akad IV, 302-4)
45. Die reine Abstraction des V erstandes, i.e., the form of universality which
the intellect, as practical Reason (or practical Reason as intellect) prescribes as
moral law in the categorical imperative
46. The synthetic judgment a priori.
47. Thought and being, or the universal and the particular, or the infinite
and the finite.
48 Critique of Judgment, sections 1-22 (Akad V, 203-44)
49. Ibid., sections 61-68 (Akad V, 359-84)
50. Ibid, General Note to First Section of the Analytic (Akad V, 241) Kant
actually speaks of "free lawfulness" and of "purposiveness without purpose"
For the "concord" see also section 9 ( Aknd V, 218, 219) and section 57, note I
(!hid' 342).
51 ltnd., section 49 (Akad V, 314)
52 !hid, section 57 !Akad V, 341)
Page 119
87
A. Kantian Philosophy
[us] a concept of it in [his doctrine of] the identity of the concepts
of nature and freedom. 53 "An esthetic Idea," according to Kant,
"cannot become cognitive because it is an intuition of the imagina-
tion for which no concept can ever be found adequate. An Idea Qf
Reason can never be cognitive because it contains a concept of the
supersensuous for which no intuition can ever be found commen-
surate.";,4 The esthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination
for which no [conceptuaifexposition can be given; the ld.e.ct_of R_ea-
son is a concept of Reason for which no demonstration can be given
-=-demonstration in the Kantian sense being the presentation of a
concept in intuition. 55 As if the esthetic Idea did not have its exposi-
tion in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not have its
demonstration in beauty. But instead of asking for an intuition of the
absolute identity of the sensuous and the supersensuous, Kant [once
more] reverts to what is the very ground of the mathematical antin-
omies :56 an intuition for the Idea of Reason [340] in which the Idea
would be experienced as purely finite and sensuous ancf simultane-
ously and contiguously experienced as a supersensuous Beyond of
experience. And he demands an exposition and cognition pf the
esthetic [intuition, i.e., the beautiful] in which the esthetic would be
exhausted by the intellect.
Since beauty is the Idea as experienced or more correctly, as in-
tuited, the form of opposition between intuition and concept- falls
away. Kant recognizes this vanishing of the antithesis negatively in
the concept of a supersensuous realm in general.57 But he does not
recognize that as beauty, it is positive, it is intuited, or to use his own
language, it is given in experience. Nor does he see the supersensu-
ous, the intelligible substratum of nature without and within us, the
thing in itself, as Kant defines the supersensuous, is at least super-
ficially cognized when the principle of beauty is given a [conceptual]
53. It is doubtful whether Hegel has any precise passage in mind here. He
may well be thinking of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (especially
sections II, III, IX); but the reader should also compare section 57 Note I, sec-
tion 59, and section 76 (Aka d. V, 174-9, 195-9, 341-4, 351-4, 397-401).
54. Section 57 Note I (Akad. V, 342).
55. In the German text, this definition of demonstration occurs in the next
sentence, but it appears to belong more naturally here; compare Critique of
Judgment, section 57, Note I (Akad. V, 343) and Critique of Pure Reason, A
734 ff., B 762 ff.
56 Compare pp. 83-4 above
57 Critique of Judgment, section 57 (Akad V, 341)
Page 235
206
Faith and Knowledge
striving: 16, 62, 64, 150
subject: empirical 59; subjectiv-
ity 61, 63, 66, 85, 149, 152,
189; absolute 96,136,170,
179; Jacobian 97, 117, 118,
136-137, 145, 147-150; Kant-
ian 67, 81, 91,123, 147; nulli-
fication of 140-143; see also
Ego
succession: see time
supersensuous, the: 56, 65, 82,
86-87,88,139,142,147,174,
175, 186-187; see also nou-
menon
teleology: XVIII, 42, 90-91, 177
thing in itself (Ding an sic h): see
Kant
thinkin~ (Denken): and intuiting
141; for Kant 70, 79; pure 66,
113; and substance 110
time: 27, 100, 102-103, 104-110,
114-115,120-123,127, 128;
the eternal124, 127, 138; the
temporal66, 127,135, 139;
nullification of 140; intuition
of 70; succession 99-103, 104,
114
totality: 41, 104-105, 109, 117,
126,132,159-161,174,189,
191; absolute 99
truth: 56, 102,158, 190; absolute
161; eternal137; and faith
124; and finitude 65; and
philosophy 124, 158
understanding: see intellect (in
Kant)
universal: 19, 22, 72, 88, 89, 136,
183; concrete universal19
Universe: nature as 41, 150-152,
175-178,182
utility: 13
Vernunft: see Reason
Verstand: see intellect'
Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet)
(1694-1778): 38,178
will, pure: 173-175, 181, 183
Wolff, Christian (1679-1754):
14,37,38,39
Page 236
An Rngllsh translation of G. W. E Hegel s
Glauben und WlSSCfl prepared and edited
by Wali'Rr Ceif & II. S Harris
As the title mdtcates, Fatlb and Knowledge deals wtth the
relation tx·tween religious faith and cognitive beliefs. between
the truth of religion and the truths of philosophy and science.
Hegel is guided by his understanding of the histoncal situa
tion: the tndivtdual alienatrd from God, na[ure, and com-
munity: and ht: is influt:nct:d by the m:w philOMJphy ufSchdl
ing, the Spinozistic Philosophy of Identity with its superb
\'ision of the mner unity of God, nature. and rational man
Through a brilli;mt discussion of the philosophi-.·s of Kant,
Fichte, and other luminaries of the period, Hegel shows that
the time.: has finally come to give philosophy the authentic
shape it has always been trying to reach, a shape in whtch
philosophy's old conflkts with religion on the one hand and
with the sci~.~nccs on tP· other arc suspended om:c for all
This is the fira English translation of this important es"a'
Profess0r H Harris offers a historical and analytic com-
mentary to the text and Professor Cerf offers an introdu
tion to the general reader which focu<>es on the concept of
intellt'Ctual intuition and on the difference between authenuc
and mauthentic phil0sophy.
Walter Ct.:rf ts professor t:mentus of philosophy at the Otv
L.niversity of New York. ll. S. I farris is professor of philos-
ophy and humanities at Glendon College, York Univcrsny.
0-88706-826 X
G. W. F. Hegel
Faith & Knowledge
Translated by Walter Cerf
and H. S. Harris
State University of New York Press
Albany 1977
Page 118
So
Fnith and Knowledge
It is, namely, in the reflecting iudgment4 :1 that Kant finds the mid-
dle term between the concept of nature and the concept of freedom.
On one side, there is the objective manifold determined by concepts,
the intellect generally44 ; and, on the other side, the intellect as pure
abstractionY Neither theoretical nor practical philosophy had lifted
themselves above the sphere of the absolute judgment ;46 the middle
ground is the region of the identity of what in the absolute judgment
is subject and predicate ;47 this identity is the one and only true Rea-
son. Yet according to Kant it belongs only i:u the reflecting judgment;
it is nothing for Reason. Throughout Kant's reflections on Reason in
its reality, that is, in his reflection on beauty as conscious intuition4~
and on beauty as non-conscious intuition, that is, on organization
[in nature] 4n one finds the Idea of Reason expressed in a more or less
formal fashion. With respect to beauty in its conscious form (die
ideelle For111 der Sclzonl1eit) Kant sets up the Idea of an imagination
lawful by itself, of lawfulness without law and of free concord of
imagination and intellect00 His explanations of this sound very em-
pirical, however. When he tells us, for example, that "an esthetic
Idea is a representation by the imagination which gives rise to much
thought without any particular concept being adequate to it, so that
it cannot be reached by, and made understandable in any language,"51
there is no sign that he has even the mildest suspicion that we are
here in the territory of Reason.
In resolving the antinomy of taste Kant comes upon Reason as
"the key to the riddle"; but it is still nothing but "the undetermined
Idea of the supersensuous in us [ ... ] without any further possibility
of its being made comprehensible""2-as if Kant himself had not given
43 Compare p. 77 n 22 above.
44. Compare Prolegomena, section 21 (Akad IV, 302-4)
45. Die reine Abstraction des V erstandes, i.e., the form of universality which
the intellect, as practical Reason (or practical Reason as intellect) prescribes as
moral law in the categorical imperative
46. The synthetic judgment a priori.
47. Thought and being, or the universal and the particular, or the infinite
and the finite.
48 Critique of Judgment, sections 1-22 (Akad V, 203-44)
49. Ibid., sections 61-68 (Akad V, 359-84)
50. Ibid, General Note to First Section of the Analytic (Akad V, 241) Kant
actually speaks of "free lawfulness" and of "purposiveness without purpose"
For the "concord" see also section 9 ( Aknd V, 218, 219) and section 57, note I
(!hid' 342).
51 ltnd., section 49 (Akad V, 314)
52 !hid, section 57 !Akad V, 341)
Page 119
87
A. Kantian Philosophy
[us] a concept of it in [his doctrine of] the identity of the concepts
of nature and freedom. 53 "An esthetic Idea," according to Kant,
"cannot become cognitive because it is an intuition of the imagina-
tion for which no concept can ever be found adequate. An Idea Qf
Reason can never be cognitive because it contains a concept of the
supersensuous for which no intuition can ever be found commen-
surate.";,4 The esthetic Idea is a representation of the imagination
for which no [conceptuaifexposition can be given; the ld.e.ct_of R_ea-
son is a concept of Reason for which no demonstration can be given
-=-demonstration in the Kantian sense being the presentation of a
concept in intuition. 55 As if the esthetic Idea did not have its exposi-
tion in the Idea of Reason, and the Idea of Reason did not have its
demonstration in beauty. But instead of asking for an intuition of the
absolute identity of the sensuous and the supersensuous, Kant [once
more] reverts to what is the very ground of the mathematical antin-
omies :56 an intuition for the Idea of Reason [340] in which the Idea
would be experienced as purely finite and sensuous ancf simultane-
ously and contiguously experienced as a supersensuous Beyond of
experience. And he demands an exposition and cognition pf the
esthetic [intuition, i.e., the beautiful] in which the esthetic would be
exhausted by the intellect.
Since beauty is the Idea as experienced or more correctly, as in-
tuited, the form of opposition between intuition and concept- falls
away. Kant recognizes this vanishing of the antithesis negatively in
the concept of a supersensuous realm in general.57 But he does not
recognize that as beauty, it is positive, it is intuited, or to use his own
language, it is given in experience. Nor does he see the supersensu-
ous, the intelligible substratum of nature without and within us, the
thing in itself, as Kant defines the supersensuous, is at least super-
ficially cognized when the principle of beauty is given a [conceptual]
53. It is doubtful whether Hegel has any precise passage in mind here. He
may well be thinking of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment (especially
sections II, III, IX); but the reader should also compare section 57 Note I, sec-
tion 59, and section 76 (Aka d. V, 174-9, 195-9, 341-4, 351-4, 397-401).
54. Section 57 Note I (Akad. V, 342).
55. In the German text, this definition of demonstration occurs in the next
sentence, but it appears to belong more naturally here; compare Critique of
Judgment, section 57, Note I (Akad. V, 343) and Critique of Pure Reason, A
734 ff., B 762 ff.
56 Compare pp. 83-4 above
57 Critique of Judgment, section 57 (Akad V, 341)
Page 235
206
Faith and Knowledge
striving: 16, 62, 64, 150
subject: empirical 59; subjectiv-
ity 61, 63, 66, 85, 149, 152,
189; absolute 96,136,170,
179; Jacobian 97, 117, 118,
136-137, 145, 147-150; Kant-
ian 67, 81, 91,123, 147; nulli-
fication of 140-143; see also
Ego
succession: see time
supersensuous, the: 56, 65, 82,
86-87,88,139,142,147,174,
175, 186-187; see also nou-
menon
teleology: XVIII, 42, 90-91, 177
thing in itself (Ding an sic h): see
Kant
thinkin~ (Denken): and intuiting
141; for Kant 70, 79; pure 66,
113; and substance 110
time: 27, 100, 102-103, 104-110,
114-115,120-123,127, 128;
the eternal124, 127, 138; the
temporal66, 127,135, 139;
nullification of 140; intuition
of 70; succession 99-103, 104,
114
totality: 41, 104-105, 109, 117,
126,132,159-161,174,189,
191; absolute 99
truth: 56, 102,158, 190; absolute
161; eternal137; and faith
124; and finitude 65; and
philosophy 124, 158
understanding: see intellect (in
Kant)
universal: 19, 22, 72, 88, 89, 136,
183; concrete universal19
Universe: nature as 41, 150-152,
175-178,182
utility: 13
Vernunft: see Reason
Verstand: see intellect'
Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet)
(1694-1778): 38,178
will, pure: 173-175, 181, 183
Wolff, Christian (1679-1754):
14,37,38,39
Page 236
An Rngllsh translation of G. W. E Hegel s
Glauben und WlSSCfl prepared and edited
by Wali'Rr Ceif & II. S Harris
As the title mdtcates, Fatlb and Knowledge deals wtth the
relation tx·tween religious faith and cognitive beliefs. between
the truth of religion and the truths of philosophy and science.
Hegel is guided by his understanding of the histoncal situa
tion: the tndivtdual alienatrd from God, na[ure, and com-
munity: and ht: is influt:nct:d by the m:w philOMJphy ufSchdl
ing, the Spinozistic Philosophy of Identity with its superb
\'ision of the mner unity of God, nature. and rational man
Through a brilli;mt discussion of the philosophi-.·s of Kant,
Fichte, and other luminaries of the period, Hegel shows that
the time.: has finally come to give philosophy the authentic
shape it has always been trying to reach, a shape in whtch
philosophy's old conflkts with religion on the one hand and
with the sci~.~nccs on tP· other arc suspended om:c for all
This is the fira English translation of this important es"a'
Profess0r H Harris offers a historical and analytic com-
mentary to the text and Professor Cerf offers an introdu
tion to the general reader which focu<>es on the concept of
intellt'Ctual intuition and on the difference between authenuc
and mauthentic phil0sophy.
Walter Ct.:rf ts professor t:mentus of philosophy at the Otv
L.niversity of New York. ll. S. I farris is professor of philos-
ophy and humanities at Glendon College, York Univcrsny.
0-88706-826 X
